

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03

INR-10 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00

RSC-01 NSC-07 DRC-01 /152 W
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P R 061450Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0269

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0144

NOFORN

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: REVISED GROUND FORCE
DATA AND THE 700,000 MAN COMMON CEILING

REF: (A) STATE 135640; (B) MBFR VIENNA 54; (C) MBFR VIENNA 55

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO WASHINGTON'S
REQUEST IN STATE 135640, PARA 10, FOR DELEGATION COMMENTS
REGARDING THE LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING. IT RECOMMENDS
THAT, DESPITE NEW DATA INDICATING A 14,000-MAN INCREASE
IN ESTIMATED WESTERN GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA,

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THE ALLIED POSITION SETTING THE COMMON CEILING IN

GROUND FORCES AT 700,000 MEN SHOULD BE RETAINED. OUR REASONS FOR THIS RECOMMENDATION ARE: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF US/ ALLIED UTILIZATION OF THE COMMON CEILING-APPROXIMATE PARITY CONCEPT WITH WESTERN PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS; TACTICAL EXIGENCIES OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS VIS-A-VIS THE EAST; AND THE PROBABLE SCOPE OF US AND EUROPEAN CLAIMS ON PHASE II REDUCTIONS. WE CONCLUDE THAT LIKELY US AND OTHER ALLIED CLAIMS ON PHASE II REDUCTIONS COULD BE ACCOMMODATED IF THE 700,000 MAN COMMON CEILING WERE RETAINED, BUT THAT THIS PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE IF, INSTEAD, THE 10 PERCENT PRINCIPLE WERE APPLIED TO THE REVISED NATO TOTAL. WE BELIEVE THE RECOMMENDED APPROACH ALSO MEETS THE REQUIREMENT OF ADEQUATE MILITARY SECURITY. END SUMMARY.

2. THE NEW ALLIED MBFR DATA SHOWING AN INCREASED GROUND FORCE TOTAL FOR NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAS RESULTED IN A POTENTIAL INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE NATO AGREEMENT TO LIMIT REDUCTIONS TO A MAXIMUM OF TEN PERCENT OF ALLIED GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND THE FACT THAT THE ALLIES ALREADY HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE EAST THAT THE COMMON CEILING BE SET AT 700,000 MEN. IN RECENT SPC DISCUSSIONS, SOME NATO REPS HAVE SPOKEN OUT IN FAVOR OF MAINTAINING THE TEN PERCENT MAXIMUM REDUCTION OBJECTIVE. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THOSE ALLIED REPS MAY NOT HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE RELEVANT IMPLICATIONS OF REVISED NATO DATA.

3. THE DELEGATION SUPPORTS RETENTION OF THE 700,000 COMMON CEILING POSITION. OUR REASONING IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. IN THE WEST, THE IDEA OF A COMMON CEILING SET AT 700,000 MEN APPEARS TO BE ACCEPTED BY PARLIAMENTARIANS AND INFORMED JOURNALISTS AS A SOUND AND REASONABLE POSITION. GIVEN THE STRONGLY POLITICAL CHARACTER OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH AIM AT GAINING SUPPORT FROM WESTERN PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS FOR THE CONCEPT OF A DURABLE CENTRAL EUROPEAN CONVENTIONAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP BASED ON APPROXIMATE PARITY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE 700,000 MAN COMMON CEILING END GOAL NOT BE SUBJECT TO REVISION AS A RESULT OF LIMITED, SUCCESSIVE CHANGES IN MBFR DATA.

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B. AS REGARDS THE EAST, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA HAVE FROM THE OUTSET OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS REPEATEDLY SUGGESTED A COMMON CEILING SET AT 700,000 MEN. IT WOULD CREATE AN UNFORTUNATE IMPRESSION WITH THE EAST IF THE ALLIES ALTERED THE 700,000 MAN COMMON CEILING FIGURE AS A RESULT OF OUR OWN APPARENT MISCALCULATION IN WESTERN FORCE TOTALS. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ARGUE WITH THE EAST THAT A PARTICULAR COMMON CEILING

LEVEL HAS OBJECTIVE MERIT FOR BOTH SIDES IF THE ALLIES
CONTEND THAT THE LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING MUST BE
RECALCULATED BECAUSE OF A TWO PERCENT INCREASE IN THE
ESTIMATE OF TOTAL WESTERN MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION
AREA. THEREFORE, TO PRESERVE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
ALLIED POSTURE WITH BOTH WESTERN PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS,
AND WITH PACT STATES, WE SHOULD AVOID THE CONFUSION
INHERENT IN FREQUENT ALTERATIONS OF OUR END GOAL TO MEET
LIMITED ADJUSTMENTS IN ALLIED TOTALS.

C. AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE AT THIS TIME, IT IS UNLIKELY
THAT THE TOTAL ALLIED CLAIMS ON MBFR REDUCTIONS COULD BE
ACCOMMODATED IF THE ALLIANCE ADHERES STRICTLY TO THE TEN
PERCENT PRINCIPLE. OUR REASONING ON THIS POINT FOLLOWS.

D. THE DELEGATION CONSIDERS THAT IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL
FOR POLITICAL AND NEGOTIATING REASONS THAT THE US
PARTICIPATE IN MBFR PHASE II REDUCTIONS. US PHASE II
REDUCTIONS WOULD APPEAR NECESSARY TO DEFLECT CONGRESSIONAL
PRESSURES FOR UNILATERAL CUTS. MOREOVER, US FAILURE
TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II MBFR REDUCTIONS WOULD RENDER
THE SECOND PHASE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE DAMAGING CRITIQUE
OF BEING A FORM OF "REVERSE BURDEN-SHARING". FROM A
NEGOTIATING STANDPOINT, SIZEABLE US PHASE II REDUCTIONS
PROBABLY WILL BE REQUIRED IF THE SOVIETS ARE TO BE
PERSUADED TO TAKE SUBSTANTIAL PHASE II REDUCTIONS.

E. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, PREFER THAT US REDUCTIONS
IN PHASE II BE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, FOR THE
REASONS INDICATED ABOVE, WE EXPECT IT MAY BE NECESSARY
FOR THE US TO TAKE ABOUT 20,000 REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II,

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0270
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0144

NOFORN

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

THUS MAKING A TOTAL OF ABOUT 50,000 IN THE TWO PHASES,
OR APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF THE 193,000 US GROUND
FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT
SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT CONGRESS TENDS TO THINK OF
US TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE AT ABOUT 300,000 RATHER THAN
THE MBFR FIGURE OF 193,000, AND THUS TO MANY CONGRESSMEN,
EVEN 50,000 US REDUCTIONS WILL LOOK MORE LIKE A 15 PERCENT THAN A 25
PERCENT REDUCTION.

F. IF THE TEN PERCENT PRINCIPLE IS APPLIED TO THE
CURRENT NATO FIGURE OF 791,000 GROUND FORCES IN THE
REDUCTION AREA (I.E., A REDUCTION OF 80,000 TO A COMMON CEILING
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AT 711,000), AND THE US TAKES TOTAL REDUCTIONS IN
PHASES I AND II OF 50,000, THEN REDUCTIONS OF APPROXIMATELY
30,000 WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR ALLOCATION AMONG THE NON-US
ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE II. IN ALLOCATING
THESE 30,000 PHASE II REDUCTIONS AMONG THE REMAINING
ALLIES, ONE LOGICAL APPROACH WOULD BE TO USE A PRO RATA
FORMULA BASED ON THE PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL ALLIED GROUND
FORCES (EXCLUDING FRENCH FORCES) IN THE AREA AFTER PHASE I
REDUCTIONS (I.E., 702,000). ON THAT BASIS, THE FRG (49 PERCENT)
WOULD TAKE 14,700 REDUCTIONS, THE UK (9 PERCENT) WOULD TAKE
2,700 REDUCTIONS, THE NETHERLANDS (10 PERCENT) WOULD TAKE 3,000
REDUCTIONS, BELGIUM (9 PERCENT) WOULD TAKE 2,700 REDUCTIONS AND
CANADA (0.6 PERCENT) WOULD TAKE 200 REDUCTIONS; (LUXEMBOURG
FORCES ARE NOT INCLUDED FOR PURPOSES OF THIS ANALYSIS).

&. HOWEVER, THE GERMANS HAVE INDICATED FREQUENTLY TO
EMBASSY BONN THAT THEIR WISH IS TO TAKE ABOUT 25,000
REDUCTIONS. AND CURRENT INTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURES

AND TRENDS IN THE UK, NETHERLANDS AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES MAKE IT UNLIKELY THAT WEST EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS IN THE ABOVE MAGNITUDES WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. BY CONTRAST, RETAINING THE 700,000 CEILING WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE AN ADDITIONAL 11,000 REDUCTIONS TO SATISFY WEST EUROPEAN CLAIMS IN PHASE II. THUS, GIVEN PROBABLE WEST EUROPEAN AND US REQUIREMENTS, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE ALLIES COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON DISTRIBUTION OF PHASE II IF THE 700,000 MAN COMMON CEILING WERE RETAINED, BUT THAT CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY WOULD ARISE IF THE TEN PERCENT PRINCIPLE WERE APPLIED.

4. WITH REGARD TO MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS, NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE ACCEPTED THAT A COMMON CEILING NOT LOWER THAN 700,000 MEN WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE MILITARY SECURITY. THEREFORE, IT WOULD NOT SEEM LOGICAL TO CONTEND THAT 711,000 WESTERN FORCES, THE FIGURE RESULTING FROM A TEN PERCENT REDUCTION OF THE NEW 791,000 TOTAL, WOULD BE REQUIRED MERELY BECAUSE NATO HAS DISCOVERED THAT IT NOW HAS 791,000 RATHER THAN 777,000 GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.

5. WE HAVE NOTED THE INFORMAL IMS ANALYSIS (REPORTED IN USNATO 3070) SUGGESTING THAT ADHERENCE TO THE 700,000

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MAN FIGURE WOULD, IN VIEW OF REVISED ESTIMATE OF NATO GROUND FORCES STRENGTH IN THE AREA, REQUIRE FURTHER REDUCTION OF COMBAT UNITS. HOWEVER, WE WOULD QUESTION WHETHER ALL OF THE ROUGHLY 11,000 ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS REQUIRED TO REACH A 700,000 MAN COMMON CEILING WOULD NECESSAIRILY HAVE TO COME OUT OF COMBAT UNITS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE USAREUR PROJECT FENDER EXERCISE DEMONSTRATED THAT IT IS IN FACT POSSIBLE TO REDUCE LOGISTICAL/SUPPORT RATHER THAN COMBAT FORCES. EVEN IF SOME PART OF THE 11,000 ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS HAD TO BE TAKEN IN COMBAT UNITS, THE ADVERSE EFFECTS WOULD BE PARTIALLY OFFSET BY THE FACT THAT, AS A RESULT OF PROJECT FENDER, NATO TODAY HAS ABOUT 3,000 MORE COMBAT SPACES IN ITS TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE THAN IN 1973 WHEN THE 700,000 MAN COMMON CEILING WAS ACCEPTED. IN ANY CASE, THE NATURE (I.E., COMBAT VS COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS) AND THE EXACT ALLOCATION OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS AMONG THE ALLIES IS A MATTER STILL TO BE DETERMINED WITHIN THE USG AND THE ALLIANCE.

6. FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, THE DELEGATION FAVORS RETENTION OF THE 700,000 MAN COMMON CEILING POSITION. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDER AUTHORIZING USNATO TO MAKE THESE POINTS ALONG THE GENERAL LINES ABOVE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.
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